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Abstract 
This study aims to explain completeness of contracts by using and extending the transaction cost 
theory. First, we investigate the impact of transaction characteristics (i.e. environmental uncertainty and 
specific investments) on contractual completeness. In addition the study extends the transaction cost view 
by investigating the moderating effect of trust on the relationship between transaction characteristics and 
contractual completeness within the context of transaction cost theory. We offer a completeness scale 
consisting of contingency planning in hotel allotment contracts. Our results from Turkish tourism industry 
support the transaction cost hypotheses and the moderating effect of trust on the relationships between 
transaction cost variables and completeness of contracts. This study extends the transaction cost literature 
on contractual completeness by showing that trust functions as moderator between the transaction cost 
variables and contractual completeness. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this study is to examine the impact of transaction characteristics including environmental 
uncertainty and transaction-specific investments and trust on the degree of contractual completeness in 
the tourism industry. For this purpose we develop a conceptual framework to explore the completeness of 
hotel allotment contracts in the Turkish tourism industry (Figure 1). According to the theoretical model, 
we anticipate that transaction characteristics have negative effects on the degree of contractual 
completeness when they lead to problems of appropriation and adaptation. In addition, we extend the 
transaction cost perspective by analyzing the impact of trust on the degree of contractual completeness.
Interorganizational trust reduces relational risk and increases information exchange thereby changing the 
costs of designing more complete contracts arising from appropriation and adaptation problems. 
Therefore we expect that trust moderates the relationships between transaction characteristics and 
contractual completeness. We empirically test the hypotheses using the data from the hotels in the 
Turkish tourism industry. The data support the transaction cost hypotheses and the moderator effects of 
trust on the degree of contractual completeness.  
Fig 1. Theoretical model 
In this paper we extend the transaction cost approach to explain contractual completeness. 
Specifically, the effects of transaction characteristics moderated by trust on the degree of contractual 
completeness are analyzed. In the existing literature empirical research on contracts is constrained by the 
difficulty to gather information on contract clauses. This study allows us to determine the provisions 
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The paper proceeds in the following way. First, we review the literature regarding contractual 
completeness. Second, we develop hypotheses concerning the impact of transaction characteristics on 
completeness and discuss the moderating effect of trust on the relationships between transaction 
characteristics and contractual completeness. Third, we explain the data collection method and analytical 
procedures in detail. Next, we test our hypotheses with hierarchical multivariate regression. Finally, we 
provide the research findings and discuss their implications.   
2. The Concept of Contractual Completeness  
According to Grossman and Hart (1986) [1] incomplete contracts result from cognitive boundaries 
and high costs of writing contracts. A contract which only specifies who has the right to decide and does 
not specify the decision actions when a certain contingency arises is incomplete. In actual contracts some 
contractual clauses regarding decision actions are specified, while the remaining contingencies are 
covered by formulating residual rights (or decision procedures) [2]. According to the incomplete contract 
theory and transaction cost theory, the contract design as incentive intensity and adaptation device differs 
in its capability to specify decision rights and actions [3], [4], [5]. The greater incentive intensity is to 
mitigate the risks of opportunism [6], [7] and the problems of performance measurement [8], [9], [10] and 
thereby to promote efficient adaptation. Contracts serve as safeguard mechanisms [11] by assigning 
decision rights (i.e. enforcing rights and monitoring rights) or contractual hostages that govern the 
problem of appropriation concerns. Beyond incentive intensity contracts may be an adaptation mechanism 
by assigning decision rights that govern the actions of exchange parties in their adaptation to unforeseen 
circumstances. Contingency planning involving anticipating and making provisions for problems during 
the contract execution period decreases the risk regarding complex tasks and appropriability of 
intellectual properties of the parties [12]. The contracts specifying contingences encourage coordination 
of the actions in interdependent tasks. The gains from designing a more complete contract are constrained 
by increasing costs of ex ante design. Thus, contracting parties have to balance the cost-risk tradeoff 
between the costs of drafting a more complete contract and the risks of incomplete agreements [7], [13].  
Although the existing literature concentrates on the explanation of the degree of contractual 
completeness from the different theoretical foundations, there is still no consensus on its dimensions [14]. 
Recently, contractual completeness has been investigated in the organizational economics and strategic 
management literature. Luo (2002) [15] defines the dimensions of complete contract as term specificity 
and contingency adaptability and examines the main effects of them on performance. In a further study, 
Luo (2005) [16] investigates an additional dimension of contractual completeness, i.e., contract 
obligatoriness, and explores the effects of institutional environment and investment characteristics on the 
three dimensions of contractual completeness by applying transaction costs and property rights reasoning. 
Anderson and Dekker (2005) [17] investigate the question if the costs of writing an agreement vary with 
the extensiveness of the contract. On the other hand, strategic management literature focuses on the 
evolution of contract design capabilities through interorganizational learning [18], [19], [10]. Argyres and 
Mayer (2007) [18] suggest that higher contract design capabilities increase contractual completeness. 
Contractual design capabilities will evolve by learning to manage the trade-offs between different types 
of contractual provisions [20]. Due to the variety of contractual dimensions used in organizational 
economics and strategic management research, Furlotti (2007) [14] criticizes the concept of completeness 
used in empirical studies and offers a multi-dimensional construct which captures multiple functions 
affecting adaptation requirements of bounded rational actors. 
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3. Hypotheses 
3.1. Transaction Cost Hypotheses 
According to the transaction cost theory [3], [21] bounded rationality limits economic agents to write 
complete contracts. Due to cognitive boundaries of contract partners and high transaction costs all 
complex contracts are incomplete. The comparative costs of contract design invoke the discriminating 
alignment [22] with transaction characteristics, such as environmental uncertainty and transaction-specific 
investments. The higher the environmental uncertainty, the higher the ex ante and ex post transaction 
costs under preplanning of decision actions, and the lower is the degree of contractual completeness. In 
consistent with Saussier (2000) [13] marginal cost of one more incremental contingent claim will be more 
than its marginal utility in a higher uncertain environment whereas the contract is more complete. 
H1: Environmental uncertainty is negatively related with the contractual completeness. 
Transaction-specific investments also influence the contract design. If an economic agent makes 
transaction-specific investments, the risk of opportunism increases with the threat of terminating the 
relationship or breaking the commitments. The renegotiation costs induced by incentives for opportunistic 
behavior can be economized by designing a more complete contract. Therefore, in the hotel-tour operator 
relationship the hotels want to protect their transaction-specific investments against opportunism by using 
more specified contracts. However, the tour operators have a strong bargaining power to influence the 
contract design and to set up more incomplete contracts in order to maintain adaptability in a changing 
business environment. Accordingly we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: Transaction-specific investments are negatively related with the contractual completeness. 
3.2. Trust Hypotheses 
In addition to the influence of environmental uncertainty and transaction-specific investments trust 
may influence contractual completeness. Specifically, trust moderates the effect of transaction 
characteristics on contractual completeness offered by the transaction cost theory. According to 
Williamson (1991) [5] trust is a shift parameter to mitigate opportunism risks through controlling 
opportunism and enhancing the capacity to process information. In addition by improving information 
sharing between the contract partners trust economizes on bounded rationality and shifts the comparative 
costs of contract design [23].  
(a) Environmental uncertainty and trust: Trust reduces the negative impact of uncertainty on 
contractual completeness because it increases information exchange between the partners thereby 
enabling the contract partners to set up more specified contracts. This effect is stronger under high trust 
than under low trust.  
(b) Transaction-specific investments and trust: The contract partners (i.e. hotels) who have invested in 
a relationship under a small number of potential partners (i.e. tour operators) will be vulnerable in 
uncertain business environments even if the both parties make transaction-specific investments. This is 
due to the fact that the hold-up risk due to asymmetric investments may not damage both parties equally 
in a unilaterally dependent relationship under high uncertainty. However, when trust exists between the 
partners, the stronger partner (i.e. tour operator) is more motivated to set up a contract design with more 
provisions that protect the hotel partner’s specific investments. In this case, trust reduces the risk of unfair 
quasi-rent allocation. As a result we formulate the following hypotheses: 
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H3: Trust has a moderating effect between transaction characteristics and contractual completeness. 
H3a: The negative impact of environmental uncertainty on contractual completeness is lower 
under a higher level of trust. 
H3b: The negative impact of transaction-specific investments on contractual completeness is 
lower under a higher level of trust. 
4. Research Methodology 
4.1. Data Collection and Sample 
In this study qualitative and quantitative methods were used to collect the data. The major method of 
the qualitative data was a document analysis of allotment contracts between tour operators and hoteliers. 
The contract provisions in a number of nonguaranteed allotment contracts were compared and contingent 
adaptability terms in non-standard and unprinted form were selected to develop the scale of contractual 
completeness. The interviews with a group of general managers or sales managers of hotels located in 
Antalya/Turkey were used to have a better understanding of contract content. The data collected through 
the document analysis and interviews were content-analyzed; they determine the items for contingency 
planning in the contractual completeness scale. In the second step a quantitative study was conducted 
through a questionnaire based survey. 
The empirical data to test the theoretical model and hypotheses were collected through an e-mail 
survey targeting first class holiday villages, five stars hotels and four stars hotels in Antalya. There are 
468 hotels according to the accommodation statistics of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism, 2010 [24]. Sample size was found about 270 hotels after the calculation for a 95% confidence 
level, 5% margin of error with a response rate of 60%. The hotels in sample were selected with using 
epsem sampling procedures. A total of 141 completed questionnaires were received. The effective 
response rate is 52%. The data were analyzed with using SPSS (18.0) package program. 
The respondents answered the questions regarding a relationship of a particular tour operator who has 
the highest sales volume in the high season. The constructs of contractual completeness, environmental 
uncertainty, asset specificity and trust were used with the control variables of origin of the tour operator, 
bargaining power and conflict resolution in the survey. We examined the potential for response bias by 
comparing early versus late responses on measures regarding conceptual constructs and control variables. 
The test of multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) shows no significant differences for the 
measures between early and late respondents (Wilk’s Lambda = 0.92, F = 1.72, p = 0.11). In addition, we 
examined the possibility of common method variance. To test this, Harman’s single factor test [25] where 
all variables are hypothesized to load on a single factor was performed using exploratory factor analytic 
approach [26], [27]. The results of the unrotated factor solution of the 16-items reveal that the first factor 
does not account for the majority of the variance (35%) and there is no general factor. 
4.2. Measurement and Validity 
The variables were measured by using multi-item scales (Table 1). The overall scale consists of items 
measuring the contractual completeness (8 items), environmental uncertainty (2 items), transaction-
specific investments (3 items) and trust (3 items). For this study, contract design is considered as a legal 
bond which accounts for a set of future contingent claims. The degree of completeness of hotel allotment 
contracts is defined by its capacity to determine future contingencies by establishing adjustment and 
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conflict resolution procedures. To operationalize the degree of completeness for a special type of 
contracts in the service industry the contract clauses in a number of nonguaranteed allotment contracts 
were compared and contingent claims in the form of unprinted and non-standard clauses [17] were 
collected to develop the scale.  
Environmental uncertainty was measured in terms of unpredictability. A two-item scale, developed 
from the interviews, was used to measure the construct. These are predictability of general tourism 
demand and hotel occupancy rate. The respondents assessed how predictable each of the items has been 
during the past 3 years and the items were measured by Likert-type scale. The other transaction 
characteristic, transaction-specific investments, refers to the investments on electronic information and 
reservation systems to coordinate the operations and the other resources and facilities to fulfill service 
standards and requirements dedicated to the relationship. According to our interviews a three-item scale 
was developed to assess the construct. In addition a three-item scale, adapted from Carson et al. (2006) 
[28], was used to measure trust.  
We conducted exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation to check the validity of the constructs. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is 0.74 and the Bartlett test of sphericity 
is highly significant (Bartlett's Test: 1228.28; p = 0.00), indicating that the data are suitable for factor 
analysis. The exploratory factor analysis yields a four-factor solution accounting for 70 percent of the 
cumulative variance. According to the Kaiser rule [29] the factors are retained with eigenvalues greater 
than 1. Factor loadings of the 16 items are above 0.50 [30], ranging from 0.64 to 0.89. The Cronbach’s 
alpha values of each construct are over 0.70 except 0.58 for environmental uncertainty. By testing the 
construct validity the reliabilities above 0.50 [31], [32] provide the evidence of internal consistency for 
each construct.  
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Cronbach Į
F1 F2 F3 F4
F1. Contractual completeness 0.90
The contract stipulates all aspects concerning the stop sale conditions, release periods and reciprocal liabilities regarding these. 0.68
The contract stipulates all aspects concerning in which circumstances the guest complaints are reasonable to subject penalties. 0.73
The contract stipulates all aspects concerning the penalties for reservation cancellations exceeding the release period and no shows. 0.86
The contract stipulates all aspects concerning enforcement and liabilities of this tour operator’s payment terms. 0.64
The contract includes the enforcement to be implemented if this tour operator can not sell its allotment. 0.74
The contract stipulates all aspects concerning the exemptions of the liabilities of the hotel in case of force majeure until the situation ends. 0.80
The agreement includes the liabilities of both parties equally. 0.72
The contract stipulates all aspects concerning the solutions of the disputes arising from the agreement. 0.81
F2. Environmental uncertainty 0.58
The predictability of general tourism demand. 0.76
The predictability of hotel occupancy rate. 0.83
F3. Transaction-specific investments 0.86
We made substantial investments in our facilities in order to provide the requirements of this tour operator. 0.89
We spend a lot of efforts and resources to meet this tour operator’s requirements for our service standards. 0.88
We spend a lot of time and resources (i.e. electronic information and reservation systems) to coordinate the operations with this tour operator. 0.81
F4. Trust 0.73
The conflicts would be resolved fairly, even if no guidelines stated in our formal agreements. 0.89
When an unexpected situation arose, the parties had a mutual understanding that a win-win solution would be found, even if it
contradicted our formal agreements. 0.88
Both parties understood that problems arising during the relationship would be solved jointly through communication and 
cooperation rather than just referring to our formal agreements. 0.79
Factor loading
dĂďůĞϭ͘ZĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ
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4.3. Control Variables 
Three control variables, origin of the tour operator (Orig), bargaining power (Br_pw) and conflict 
resolution (Cn_res), which might influence the dependent variable, were incorporated in the model. We 
consider the effect of bargaining power on contract design. When a partner’s bargaining position is 
relatively low, interest conflicts are likely resolved in favor of the powerful partner who has more 
decision and control rights in the processes of bargaining and negotiation of contractual clauses [33], [34], 
[35]. As the European travel industry is increasingly being concentrated by the leading tour operators, 
entry barriers to alternative members of distribution channels increases the dependence of hotels. 
However they can balance their dependence on tour operators by influencing the customers’ preferences 
and repeated customer rate. Hotels with strong brand names have relatively high bargaining power during 
the negotiation process of contracts. As a result, we assert that hoteliers with higher bargaining power can 
design more complete contracts. Bargaining power was measured by using a 7-point Likert scale 
indicating the bargaining position of hoteliers in the negotiation and contract design process. 
Origin of the tour operator in a particular relationship refers to the country generating tourism demand 
by tour operators. The categories of tour operators were analyzed whether there is a difference between 
the groups regarding the degree of contractual completeness. The result of Anova test shows that there is 
a significant difference among the tour operator groups (F=8.07; p<0.01). Tukey’s post hoc comparisons 
of the groups indicate that German contracts are significantly more incomplete than the others. Then we 
used a dummy variable which equals 0 if the origin of tour operators is not in a German travel group and 
1 if it is in a German travel group. The second dummy variable of conflict resolution is conducted with 
the tendencies of hoteliers to handle conflict of interests: 0 indicates resolution without court and 1 court 
resolution if necessary.  
5. Results 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables. The 
results show that the transactional variables and the control variable of origin of tour operators (Orig) are 
negatively correlated with the degree of contractual completeness (Comp). The construct of trust is 
positively correlated with Comp. Bargaining power (Br_pw) and conflict resolution (Cn_res) has also 
positive correlation with Comp. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations (N = 141) 
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To test our hypotheses, we estimated the following regression models: 
Comp = Į0 – ȕ1Orig + ȕ2Br_pw + ȕ3Cn_res + ũ1      (1) 
Comp = Į0 – ȕ1Orig + ȕ2Br_pw + ȕ3Cn_res – ȕ4EU – ȕ5TSI + ũ2    (2) 
 Comp = Į0 – ȕ1Orig + ȕ2Br_pw + ȕ3Cn_res – ȕ4EU – ȕ5TSI + ȕ6Trust*EU + ȕ7Trust*TSI + ũ3 (3) 
To test the hypotheses each set of variables were included in the model block by block for testing the 
exploratory power of treatments. Equation (1) captures control variables including Orig, Br_pw and 
Cn_res. Equation (2) is a function of control variables and direct effects of transaction characteristics. 
Finally, equation (3) estimates the overall model as a function of control variables, direct effects and 
interaction effects of trust. In this model the largest variance inflation factor as an indicator of probable 
multicollinearity is 1.12, well below the 10.0 cutoff [36]. Thus there is unlikely a multicollinearity 
problem. 
Results of hierarchical moderated regression approach to test the hypotheses are summarized in Table 
3. As shown in Model 2, we found significant negative relationships between EU and Comp (ȕ= −0.203, 
p<0.01) and TSI and Comp (ȕ = −0.240, p<0.01). These results provide support to H1 which predicts that 
under bounded rationality and uncertain business environment designing a more complete contract is 
more costly than its potential savings due to reduced opportunism risk. In addition, they provide support 
for H2 which predicts that hotels’ transaction-specific investments are negatively related with the degree 
of Comp because conflicts of interest can be more easily and less costly solved in favor of tour operators 
during the contract period when the contracts are less specified. 
In the third block of variable set the interaction effects between trust and EU and between trust and 
TSI were examined. The results indicate that both interaction effects are positive and significant. 
Therefore we provide support for the moderating effect of trust on the relationship between transaction 
characteristics and contractual completeness. First, trust shifts the costs of more complete contract design 
under environmental uncertainty by reducing relational risk and increasing information sharing. 
Accordingly, the negative impact of EU on Comp is lower under a higher level of trust, based on H3a (ȕ = 
1.850, p<0.01). Second, trust reduces the risk of tour operators’ inflexibility of more specified contracts 
for protecting the hotels’ transaction-specific investments (ȕ = 0.808, p<0.05) in unilateral relationships; 
hence H3b is supported. 
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Table 3. The hypotheses tests with hierarchical multivariate regression (N = 141)+ 
+ Standardized regression coefficients are reported.
Regarding the control variables we found a significant negative relationship between Orig and Comp 
(ȕ = −0.284, p<0.01). The result shows that the contracts between hotels and tour operators from German 
travel chains have been designed less complete. This may indicate that German tour operators may have a 
stronger influence on the contract design due to their market power. When the hoteliers have the 
possibility to recourse to courts in resolving conflicts of interest, contracts are more specified; this is 
consistent with the positive relationship between Cn_res and Comp (ȕ = 0.288, p<0.01). Finally, the 
higher the bargaining power of hoteliers on specifying contractual rights the higher is the degree of 
contractual completeness (ȕ = 0.225, p<0.01). 
6. Conclusion 
Contract design functions as a governance device to solve adaptability and incentive intensity 
problems due to transaction hazards. This study has examined the impact of transaction costs variables 
(i.e. environmental uncertainty and transaction-specific investments) and trust on the completeness of 
hotel allotment contracts in the Turkish tourism industry. First, we found that the transaction 
characteristics (i.e. environmental uncertainty and specific investments) have a negative effect on 
contractual completeness. Second, we found that trust moderates the impact of transaction cost variables 
on contractual completeness. Specifically, our research findings regarding the design of hotel allotment 
contracts can be summarized as follows:  
- The unpredictability of tourism demand makes the design of more specified hotel allotment 
contracts difficult.  
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- When the hotels make high transaction-specific investments and the tour operators have high 
bargaining power, the hotels are strongly dependent to the tour operators. In this situation, the 
tour operators set up less complete contracts to increase the flexibility to adapt the changing 
environmental circumstances.  
- As the level of trust between hotels and tour operators increases, the negative effect of 
environmental uncertainty and transaction-specific investments on contractual completeness 
decreases because trust increases information sharing and the cooperative behavior between the 
contract partners.  
Overall, this study extends the transaction cost view on contractual completeness by investigating the 
impact of trust on contractual completeness. Specifically, we add the moderating effect of trust on the 
relationship between transaction characteristics and contractual completeness. It is expected that this 
paper will make a contribution to the existing literature by explaining the contract design between hotels 
and tour operators from the adaptability view of transaction cost theory. A tentative meaning of the study 
for the practitioners is that tour operators and hotels might write more specified contracts when the 
negative impact of exchange hazards on the contract design may be weakened by a high level of trust.  
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